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Belief revision as a problem of scientific epistemology

Yaroslav V. Shramko

ACNS Conference Series: Social Sciences and Humanities, Volume 1 (2022): Conference on Computer Simulation and Information Technology in Education (KMITO 1999) 19-21 April 1999, Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine, Article 01001

Published online: 1 January 2022

Abstract

The fundamental question that must be answered by any theory of knowledge that claims to be adequate is the question of how it is possible to change our knowledge. The very fact of change undoubtedly takes place, and the problem is to theoretically explicate this fact. The methodological significance of this issue is due to the fact that changing knowledge means nothing more than its development, namely, the question of the ways and means of developing our knowledge is of central importance both for the logic and methodology of science, and for general epistemology. This work is of a review character, and aims to draw the reader’s attention to a new promising direction in the modern theory of knowledge called “belief revision”.

Keywords

belief revision, scientific epistemology

DOI

https://doi.org/10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001

Cite this article

Shramko, Y.V., 2022. Belief revision as a problem of scientific epistemology. ACNS Conference Series: Social Sciences and Humanities,1, p.01001. Available from: https://doi.org/10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001

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	author = {Yaroslav V. Shramko},
	title = {{Belief revision as a problem of scientific epistemology}},
	journal = {{ACNS Conference Series: Social Sciences and Humanities}},
	abstract = {The fundamental question that must be answered by any theory of knowledge that claims to be adequate is the question of how it is possible to change our knowledge. The very fact of change undoubtedly takes place, and the problem is to theoretically explicate this fact. The methodological significance of this issue is due to the fact that changing knowledge means nothing more than its development, namely, the question of the ways and means of developing our knowledge is of central importance both for the logic and methodology of science, and for general epistemology. This work is of a review character, and aims to draw the reader’s attention to a new promising direction in the modern theory of knowledge called “belief revision”.},
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