Belief revision as a problem of scientific epistemology
ACNS Conference Series: Social Sciences and Humanities, Volume 1 (2022): Conference on Computer Simulation and Information Technology in Education (KMITO 1999) 19-21 April 1999, Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine, Article 01001
Published online: 1 January 2022
The fundamental question that must be answered by any theory of knowledge that claims to be adequate is the question of how it is possible to change our knowledge. The very fact of change undoubtedly takes place, and the problem is to theoretically explicate this fact. The methodological significance of this issue is due to the fact that changing knowledge means nothing more than its development, namely, the question of the ways and means of developing our knowledge is of central importance both for the logic and methodology of science, and for general epistemology. This work is of a review character, and aims to draw the reader’s attention to a new promising direction in the modern theory of knowledge called “belief revision”.
belief revision, scientific epistemology
@article{10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001,
doi = {10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001},
url = {https://doi.org/10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001},
year = {2022},
publisher = {{Academy of Cognitive and Natural Sciences}},
volume = {1},
pages = {01001},
author = {Yaroslav V. Shramko},
title = {{Belief revision as a problem of scientific epistemology}},
journal = {{ACNS Conference Series: Social Sciences and Humanities}},
abstract = {The fundamental question that must be answered by any theory of knowledge that claims to be adequate is the question of how it is possible to change our knowledge. The very fact of change undoubtedly takes place, and the problem is to theoretically explicate this fact. The methodological significance of this issue is due to the fact that changing knowledge means nothing more than its development, namely, the question of the ways and means of developing our knowledge is of central importance both for the logic and methodology of science, and for general epistemology. This work is of a review character, and aims to draw the reader’s attention to a new promising direction in the modern theory of knowledge called “belief revision”.},
keywords = {belief revision, scientific epistemology}
}
TY - JOUR ID - 10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001 DO - 10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001 UR - https://doi.org/10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001 TI - Belief revision as a problem of scientific epistemology T2 - ACNS Conference Series: Social Sciences and Humanities AU - Shramko, Yaroslav V. PY - 2022 PB - Academy of Cognitive and Natural Sciences SP - 01001 VL - 1 AB - The fundamental question that must be answered by any theory of knowledge that claims to be adequate is the question of how it is possible to change our knowledge. The very fact of change undoubtedly takes place, and the problem is to theoretically explicate this fact. The methodological significance of this issue is due to the fact that changing knowledge means nothing more than its development, namely, the question of the ways and means of developing our knowledge is of central importance both for the logic and methodology of science, and for general epistemology. This work is of a review character, and aims to draw the reader’s attention to a new promising direction in the modern theory of knowledge called “belief revision”. KW - belief revision KW - scientific epistemology ER -
%0 Journal Article %F 10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001 %R 10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001 %U https://doi.org/10.55056/cs-ssh/1/01001 %T Belief revision as a problem of scientific epistemology %J ACNS Conference Series: Social Sciences and Humanities %A Shramko, Yaroslav V. %D 2022 %I Academy of Cognitive and Natural Sciences %P 01001 %V 1 %X The fundamental question that must be answered by any theory of knowledge that claims to be adequate is the question of how it is possible to change our knowledge. The very fact of change undoubtedly takes place, and the problem is to theoretically explicate this fact. The methodological significance of this issue is due to the fact that changing knowledge means nothing more than its development, namely, the question of the ways and means of developing our knowledge is of central importance both for the logic and methodology of science, and for general epistemology. This work is of a review character, and aims to draw the reader’s attention to a new promising direction in the modern theory of knowledge called “belief revision”. %K belief revision, scientific epistemology
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